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THE SIXTY-NINTH CLEVELAND-MARSHALL FUND LECTURE 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, OR HOW THE 
PEOPLE  BECAME JUDGES IN THEIR OWN CAUSES 
GORDON S. WOOD1 
Tracing the origins of American democracy is no easy task.  Where should we 
begin?  With the English Civil War?  Or with the English Glorious Revolution of 
1688-89?  Or perhaps we should go back to the Magna Carta and the beginnings of 
Parliament?  Or maybe the ancient Greeks?  If we are not careful we are apt to end 
up like the eighteenth-century Puritan historian Thomas Prince, who in 1736 set out 
to write A Chronological History of New-England by beginning with the creation of 
Adam and Eve.  Prince then went through the histories of ancient Israel, Babylonia, 
Persia, Greece, Rome, and so on, and by his second volume was able to get only to 
1633 in New England before he died literally in mid-sentence.2 
I am going to begin with the American Revolution because that is where I believe 
American democracy, as we understand it today, really began.  I realize it is 
unfashionable, if not outlandish, to claim that anything substantial or at least 
substantially progressive came out of the American Revolution.  These days we are 
more apt to emphasize that the American Revolution was a failure.  As one young 
historian recently put it, the Revolution “failed to free the slaves, failed to offer full 
political equality to women, . . . failed to grant citizenship to Indians, [and] failed to 
create an economic world in which all could compete on equal terms.”3  Such 
statements suggest a threshold of success that no eighteenth-century revolution could 
possibly have attained, and perhaps tell us more about the present politics of 
historians than they do about the Revolution.  It is true that the Revolution did not 
free all the slaves in the country, although it did free all the slaves in the northern 
states.  And it’s true that it did not grant full political equality to women or grant 
citizenship to Indians.  Whether the Revolution failed to create an economic world in 
which all could compete on equal terms seems to be more problematical.  Certainly 
for white men at least, it created an economic world that offered at that time more 
opportunities for getting ahead and making money than any other place in the 
western world.  What the Revolution did succeed in doing, however, was to create 
democracy as Americans came to know it. 
Democracy, of course, is a historically determined concept, and there is no one 
abstract and timeless meaning of the term.  For some people it may mean only the 
existence of a government in which most adults can vote.  Or for others it may mean 
                                                                
1Gordon S. Wood is the Alva O. Way University Professor and Professor of History at 
Brown University.  He is the author of The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 and 
The Radicalism of the American Revolution. 
2THOMAS PRINCE, A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND IN THE FORM OF ANNALS 
(1736). 
3PETER C. MANCALL, VALLEY OF OPPORTUNITY: ECONOMIC CULTURE ALONG THE UPPER 
SUSQUEHANNA, 1700-1800 232 (1991). 
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simply majority rule.  For others it may mean a system of government in which 
minorities of all sorts are allowed to participate—the assumption being that 
majorities can take care of themselves.  For still others democracy has come to mean 
merely the protection of individual liberties and rights—that without these 
protections voting and participation in government are essentially meaningless.  And 
finally for others democracy may be identified with equality, with feelings of 
sameness between people. 
All of these meanings may have relevance today, but all of them are essentially 
the products of the American Revolution.  Within the three or four decades 
surrounding the War for Independence, America experienced the birth of democracy, 
broadly speaking, in all of its manifestations.  What I would like to do in this lecture 
is explain, very briefly, surely too briefly, what I think happened. 
It is important to note at the outset, however, that creating democracy, meaning 
self-government, was never the goal of the Revolution. Protecting liberty was.  The 
Revolutionaries, like all Englishmen from time immemorial, thought of democracy, 
or representative self-government, as subordinate to their rights and liberties.  Self-
government was never an end in itself but a means to an end.  That is to say, in Isaiah 
Berlin’s terms, Englishmen valued positive liberty, or representative self-
government, only so far as it protected negative liberty, or their various individual 
rights and privileges.  The end for Englishmen was always the preservation of their 
rights and liberties.  Self-government, or their representation in Parliament, was 
valued because it had become the essential bulwark safeguarding their rights and 
liberties against the power of the crown.  The colonists likewise valued their several 
provincial assemblies largely because they were the guardians of their rights and 
liberties.  Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic entertained no classical illusions 
that representative self-government, that participation in politics by itself, could be 
the source of human flourishing. 
So democracy was not what most eighteenth century Englishmen were trying to 
achieve. Of course, by the standards of the age the American colonists, or at least the 
white colonists, already possessed the most democratic societies and governments in 
the world.  So democratic were they that some historians nearly a half century ago 
argued that colonial America was already a middle-class democracy.  Prosperity was 
widespread, and most adult white males in the eighteenth century were eligible to 
vote for their representatives in their assemblies, even if they often chose not to 
exercise this eligibility.  Certainly the right to vote was a prerequisite to the 
development of democracy in America, but what went on in colonial America was 
not democratic politics as the nineteenth century understood it or we today would 
understand it, or at least should understand it.  We ought to know by now that 
democracy is far more than a mere matter of people having the right to vote. 
Before the 1730s or so, politics in the American colonies remained focused on 
the metropolitan center of the empire.  In the early decades of the eighteenth century 
elite factions opposed to the royal governors usually sought political leverage within 
the imperial arena, resorting to imperial interests and connections in order to win 
political battles.  They used extra-legal channels in the home country like merchant 
groups in London in order to undermine the governors’ political position from the 
rear.  Or they formed alliances with other imperial agents like those representing the 
Church of England in order to by-pass the governors.  Opposition leaders even made 
personal journeys to the metropolitan center of power to lobby for the reversal of 
gubernatorial decisions or even the removal of a governor.  This kind of Anglo-
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/3
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American politics was open-ended.  No decision in the colonies was final.  There 
were many trans-Atlantic avenues of influence and connection and many appeals 
over the heads of local officials to Whitehall.4 
But after 1730 or so this open-ended character of American politics changed, and 
the colonists’ ability to influence English politics sharply declined.  Communications 
to the mother country became more formal, and personal appeals declined.  The 
colonial lobbying agents who earlier had been initiators of colonial policy were now 
hard put to head off colonial measures begun by others.  As the earlier trans-Atlantic 
channels and avenues of influence clogged up or closed off, the royal governors were 
left as the only major link between the colonies and Great Britain.5 
Under these changed circumstances dissident factions in the colonies were forced 
to turn inward, toward the only source of authority other than the king recognized by 
eighteenth century political theory—the people.  Opposition groups now sought to 
use the popular assemblies as their main instrument of opposition against the 
governors.  The number of contested elections for the colonial assemblies grew 
rapidly.  In Boston, for example, in the decade of the 1720s only thirty percent of 
elections were contested; by the 1750s sixty percent were.  With the growth of 
contested elections came greater voter participation and more vitriolic political 
rhetoric and propaganda.  Groups began forming tickets, caucuses, and political 
clubs, and hiring professional pamphleteers to attack their opponents for being 
overstuffed men of wealth and learning.  In these mid-eighteenth century 
developments we can see the beginnings of what would eventually become typically 
American egalitarian electoral propaganda and modern political campaigning.6 
But of course nobody had the future in mind.  These elite families and groups 
were not trying to create the democratic world of the nineteenth century; they were 
simply using whatever weapons they had at their disposal—together with 
inflammatory popular Whig rhetoric—to get at their opponents.  All of their appeals 
to the people were merely tactical devices for gaining office.  But of course once 
invoked these devices took on a power of their own.  The people once mobilized 
could not easily be put down.  The colonial assemblies, which earlier had been 
virtual closed clubs, now became more sensitive to the public out-of-doors.  They 
began publishing compilations of their laws and revealing how their members voted 
on particular issues.  They built galleries in the legislative halls for the people to 
witness debates.  Some even began calling for a widening of the suffrage.  Those 
who opposed these measures were labeled “enemies of the people.”7 
                                                                
4On the politics of the imperial relationship see the works by ALISON GILBERT OLSON, 
ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICS, 1660-1775: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES IN ENGLAND 
AND COLONIAL AMERICA (1973), and ALISON GILBERT OLSON, MAKING THE EMPIRE WORK: 
LONDON AND AMERICAN INTEREST GROUPS, 1690-1790 (1992). 
5On the increasing difficulties of colonial communication in the empire on the eve of the 
Revolution, see MICHAEL KAMMEN, A ROPE OF SAND: THE COLONIAL AGENTS, BRITISH 
POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1968). 
6Gary B. Nash, The Transformation of Urban Politics, 1700-1764, 60 J. OF AM. HIST. 605-
32 (1973). 
7J.R. POLE, THE GIFT OF GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE ENGLISH 
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Despite these continual Whig appeals to the people, however, politics in the 
colonies still remained pre-modern—essentially a contest among prominent families 
for the control of state offices.  The society was anything but democratic; it remained 
aristocratic and hierarchical, tied together by numerous vertical lines of personal 
influence converging on particular people of wealth and power.  There were no 
organizations resembling modern political parties, which itself is a sign that this 
ancien régime politics was very different from what would later emerge.  Of course, 
political factions of one sort or another existed, but these were not similar to modern 
political parties; they were in fact little more than congeries of the leading gentry's 
personal and family "interests."  Some have explained the absence of organized 
political parties in the eighteenth century by emphasizing the age's abhorrence of 
division.  But the personal structure of politics was more important than this 
intellectual aversion to parties, for when that personal structure of the society 
changed, then parties emerged even in the teeth of their continued cultural rejection.  
It was this personal structure of politics—not any elaborate legal restrictions on the 
suffrage—that kept most ordinary people from participating in politics. 
Personal patronage dominated colonial society, and this alone made it something 
other than a democratic society.  A generation ago historians used the conception of 
“deference” to explain why the common people who could legally vote seldom did 
so.8  Or why when they did vote, they voted only for the same prominent families.  
But this acquiescence that people gave to those who by their wealth, influence, and 
independence were considered best qualified to rule was based not simply on 
traditional habits of deference but, more important, on the substantial dependency 
that patronage created.  In 1773 in the Mohawk district of Tryon County, New York, 
at least four hundred men had the franchise.  Yet in an election for five constables 
only fourteen electors turned out to vote; all fourteen were closely tied by interest or 
patronage to Sir William Johnson, the local grandee of the area, and all fourteen 
naturally voted for the same five candidates.9 
Translating the personal, social, and economic authority of the gentry into 
political patronage and power was essentially what eighteenth-century politics was 
about.  The process was self-intensifying: social authority created political power, 
which in turn created more social influence.  Some members of the gentry, such as 
the Tidewater planters of Virginia or the wealthy landholders of the Connecticut 
River valley, had enough patronage and influence to overawe entire communities.  
Connecticut River valley gentry like Israel Williams and John Worthington, so 
imposing as to be called "river gods," used their power to become at one time or 
another selectmen of their towns, representatives to the Massachusetts General 
Court, members of the Council, provincial court judges, justices of the peace, and 
colonels of their county regiments.  It became impossible to tell where the circle of 
their authority began: the political authority to grant licenses for taverns or mills, to 
determine the location of roads and bridges, or to enlist men for military service was 
of a piece with their wealth and social influence. 
It was likewise substantial paternalistic and patronage power, and not merely the 
treating of the freeholders with toddy at election time, that enabled the great Virginia 
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planters to mobilize their "interests" and to maintain law and order over their local 
communities without the aid of police forces.  The leading Virginia gentry were the 
vestrymen of their parishes and the lay leaders of the Anglican church, so that the 
sacredness of religion and the patronage of poor relief further enhanced the hierarchy 
of authority.  All this was the stuff of which aristocracies were made. 
What I have been describing is not what we usually understand to be a 
democratic society.  It was a pre-modern patronage society.  Those who had the 
property and power to exert influence in any way—whether by lending money, doing 
favors, or supplying employment—created obligations and dependencies that could 
be turned into political authority. 
Social authority and political authority were supposed to coincide. Which meant 
that in this traditional society there was as yet no sharp distinction between the 
private and public spheres.  The king's inherited rights to govern the realm—his 
prerogatives—were as much private as they were public, just as the people's ancient 
rights or liberties were as much public as they were private.  So-called public 
institutions had private rights and private persons had public obligations.  The king's 
prerogatives, or his premier rights to govern the realm, grew out of his private 
position as the wealthiest of the wealthy and the largest landowner in the society; his 
government had really begun as an extension of his royal household.  But in a like 
manner all private households or families—"those small subdivisions of 
Government," one colonist called them—had public responsibilities to help the king 
govern.10 
Indeed, all government was regarded essentially as the enlisting and mobilizing 
of the power of private persons to carry out public ends.  If the eighteenth-century 
city of New York wanted its streets cleaned or paved, for example, it did not hire 
contractors or create a "public works" department; instead it issued ordinances 
obliging each person in the city to clean or repair the street abutting his house or 
shop.11  In the same way if the colony of Connecticut wanted a college, it did not 
build and run the college itself, but instead gave legal rights to private persons to 
build and run it, in short, creating what were called corporations.  Most public 
action—from the building of wharves and ferries to the maintaining of roads and 
inns—depended upon private energy and private funds.  Governments tended to lack 
much revenue and instead tended to rely mostly on the legal authority they 
possessed.  They issued sanctions against private persons for failure to perform their 
public duties, and they enticed private persons into fulfilling public goals by offering 
corporate charters, licenses, and various other legal immunities together with fee-
collecting offices.  Since the government was only one property-holder in a world of 
property-holders, it could not take “private” property for “public” purposes without 
the consent of the owner of that property; in other words, it had no modern power of 
eminent domain. 
Only in the context of these traditional assumptions about the nature and 
limitations of pre-modern government can we appreciate the role of patronage in that 
monarchical society.  Like the Revolutionaries, we today can see only what both the 
Revolutionaries and we call “corruption”—the exploitation of "public" office for 
                                                                
10PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 1767. 
11HENDRICK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983). 
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“private” gain.  But, of course, traditionally and ideally it was supposed to be the 
other way round: the “public” exploitation of “private” authority.  Since everyone in 
the society had an obligation to help govern the realm commensurate with his social 
rank—the king's being the greatest because he stood at the top of the social 
hierarchy—important offices were supposed to be held only by those who were 
already worthy and had already achieved economic and social superiority.  Just as 
gentlemen were expected to staff the officers' corps of the army, so were independent 
gentlemen of leisure and education expected to supply leadership for government.  
Since such well-to-do gentry were "exempted from the lower and less honourable 
employments," wrote the British philosopher Francis Hutcheson, they were "rather 
more than others obliged to an active life in some service to mankind.  The publick 
has this claim upon them." 12 
Governmental service, in other words, was supposed to be a personal sacrifice 
required of certain gentlemen because of their talents, independence, and social 
preeminence.  Office-holding was supposed to be a burden, attended, as leaders like 
George Washington said, with expense and trouble without the least prospect of 
gain.  Of course, many offices offered the holders incentives in the form of fees, 
rewards, or benefits, sometimes quite lucrative ones.  But always it was assumed that 
granting such offices together with their perquisites was the best way for these pre-
modern governments to get things done without incurring any direct public costs. 
Since the society and state were assumed to be identical, government office 
seemed to belong to men of property and high social rank in the same way that the 
throne belonged to the king.  And because office was an extension into government 
of the private person, the greater the private person, the greater the office.  Access to 
government therefore often came quickly and easily to those who had the necessary 
social credentials.  Thus wealthy John Dickinson could be elected to the Delaware 
assembly in 1760 at the age of twenty-eight and promptly be made its speaker.  So 
too could Jonathan Trumbull, a poor, obscure country merchant, be catapulted into 
speakership of the Connecticut assembly at twenty-eight and into the council at the 
age of twenty-nine simply by the fact that his marriage into the ancient and 
prestigious Robinson family had given him, as his contemporary Samuel Peters put 
it, "the prospect of preferment in civil life."13 
Since these colonial governments lacked most of the coercive powers of a 
modern state—a few constables and sheriffs scarcely constituted a police force—
officeholders relied on their own social respectability and private influence to 
compel the obedience of ordinary people.  Ordinary people could become hog reeves 
or occupy other lowly offices, but they had no business exercising high political 
office, since, in addition to being caught up in their petty workaday interests, they 
had no power, no connections, no social capacity for commanding public allegiance 
and deference.  Thus when in 1759 the governor of Massachusetts appointed as a 
justice of the peace in Hampshire County someone whose company the other local 
justices declared they were "never inclined to keep," eleven of the justices resigned 
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in protest, saying that such an appointment would make the office contemptible in 
the eyes of the people and diminish their ability to enforce the law.14 
This then was the old society that the Revolution was designed to change.  By the 
eve of the Revolution many colonists had come to believe that their politics were 
poisoned by corruption.  The colonists thought that most crown officials were not the 
natural leaders of their society and that too many of them using their offices and their 
powers of patronage for private gain. 
The Revolutionary goal was to create republican polities where these sorts of 
abuses would no longer exist.  The Revolutionaries sought to destroy the patronage 
that had permeated ancien régime politics and to create citizens who were equal, 
independent, and free from dependency on grandees and patrons.  But the republican 
revolution aimed to do more: it sought to assert the primacy of the public good over 
all private interests, indeed, to separate the public from the private and to prevent the 
intrusion of private interests into the public realm.  These goals compelled 
revolutionary Americans to conceive of state power in radically new ways. 
No longer could government be seen as the exercise of the king's personal 
authority or as a bundle of prerogative rights.  Rulers suddenly lost their traditional 
personal rights to rule, and personal allegiance as a civic bond became meaningless.  
The revolutionary state constitutions eliminated the crown's prerogatives outright or 
re-granted them to the state legislatures.  These constitutional grants of authority 
together with the expanded notion of consent underlying all government gave the 
state legislatures a degree of public power that the colonial assemblies had never 
claimed or even imagined. 
The colonial legislatures had rarely legislated in any modern sense.  They had 
done little more than respond to numerous private petitions and local grievances of 
individuals and groups.  But the Revolution, with its need for revenue, men, and 
material to wage war, changed all that.  Overnight the state assemblies became 
sovereign embodiments of the people with responsibility for exercising an 
autonomous public authority.  In republican America, government would no longer 
be merely private property and private interests writ large as it had been in the 
colonial period.  Public and private spheres that earlier had been mingled were now 
to be separated.  Res publica became everything.  The new republican states saw 
themselves promoting a unitary public interest that was to be clearly distinguishable 
from the many private interests of their societies. 
From the outset the new republican states thus tended to view with suspicion the 
traditional monarchical practice of enlisting private wealth and energy for public 
purposes by issuing corporate privileges and licenses to private persons.  In a 
republic no person should be allowed to exploit the public's authority for private 
gain.  Indeed, several of the states wrote into their revolutionary constitutions 
declarations, like that of New Hampshire, which stated that "government is instituted 
for the common benefit, protection, and security of the whole community, and not 
for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men."15 
The republican state governments sought to assert their newly enhanced public 
power in direct and unprecedented ways—doing for themselves what they had earlier 
commissioned private persons to do.  They carved out exclusively public spheres of 
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action and responsibility where none had existed before.  They now drew up plans 
for improving everything from trade and commerce to roads and waterworks and 
helped to create a science of political economy for Americans.  And they formed 
their own public organizations with paid professional staffs supported by tax money, 
not private labor.  This was what the Revolutionaries now meant by republican self-
government.  The city of New York, for example, working under the authority of the 
state legislature, now set up its own public work force to clean its streets and 
wharves instead of relying, as in the past, on the private residents to do these tasks.  
By the early nineteenth century the city of New York had become a public institution 
financed primarily by public taxation and concerned with particularly public 
concerns.  Like other post-revolutionary governments, New York City acquired what 
it had not had before—the modern power of eminent domain—the authority to take 
private property for the sake of the public good without the consent of the particular 
property-owner.16 
This republicanism was at the same time both radical and traditional in its goals.  
Its politics had two principal characteristics.  First, it sought to keep all private 
interests out of government, out of the public realm.  Yet, secondly, at the same time 
it continued to cling to the traditional notion that social and political authority would 
be identical, that is, that the social leaders would be the political leaders.  Only now 
in the new republican societies it was expected that the social and political leaders 
would be not only those who were independent and capable of transcending market 
interests but also those who possessed the most merit, talent, virtue—the 
characteristics of Jefferson’s natural aristocracy. 
Republicanism thus put a premium on having not only a virtuous population, but, 
more important, a special kind of virtuous or disinterested leadership, that is, leaders 
whose independence, education, and capacity to rise above their private interests 
would enable them to act impartially for the good of the public.  This is the reason 
that good republicans like James Madison continued to believe that ordinary, 
middling sorts—artisans, traders, commercial farmers, businessmen—could not 
make good political leaders.  The interests and occupations of such ordinary men 
were thought too strong for them to set aside or transcend.  They could never act as 
disinterested umpires among the contending private interests in the society. 
If it turned out that America’s political leaders were to be largely drawn from the 
ranks of these middling sorts of interested men, who were incapable of disinterested 
leadership and who were not able to keep their private interests out of the public 
arena, then, of course, the grand republican experiment would fail. 
It was the realization that this kind of disinterested leadership was not emerging 
in the new state legislatures that lay behind the crisis of the 1780s.  Leaders like 
Madison came to believe that the state legislatures were too much dominated by 
illiberal, narrow-minded, localist politicians who had private and factional interests 
to promote at the expense of the public interest.  New petty middling entrepreneurs 
like Abraham Yates, a part-time lawyer and shoemaker of Albany and William 
Findley, a Scotch-Irish ex-weaver of western Pennsylvania, had taken advantage of 
the newly enlarged legislatures and the expanded suffrage and had become 
spokesmen for a variety of popular special interests, including the printing of paper 
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money.  By the 1780s it was obvious to many, as James Madison put it, that "a spirit 
of locality" was destroying "the aggregate interests of the Community."17  
Everywhere the gentry complained of democratic legislative practices that we today 
have come to take for granted—logrolling, horse-trading, and pork barreling that 
benefited special and local interest-groups.  Each representative, grumbled Ezra 
Stiles, president of Yale College, was concerned only with the particular interests of 
his electors.  Whenever a bill was read in the legislature, said Stiles, "every one 
instantly thinks how it will affect his constituents."18 
Parochial politics was not new to America; after all, the colonial assemblies had 
spent much of their time fixing the height of fence posts and adjudicating all sort of 
petty local grievances.  But what was happening now was new.  Constituents were 
now pressuring their representatives to legislate in a modern instrumental fashion on 
behalf of their interests, which were usually commercial interests.  Farmers in debt 
urged low taxes, the suspension of court actions to recover debts, and the continued 
printing of paper money.  Merchants and creditors called for high taxes on land, the 
protection of private contracts, and the encouragement of foreign trade.  Artisans 
lobbied for the regulation of the prices of agricultural products, the abolition of 
mercantile monopolies, and tariff protection against imported manufactured goods.  
Entrepreneurs everywhere petitioned for legal privileges and corporate grants. And 
in the state legislatures representatives of these interests were passing laws on their 
behalf, legislating in a modern programmatic manner. 
To us today there is nothing remarkable about what these popular legislative 
representatives were doing; they were simply promoting modern democracy.  Like 
republicanism, the politics of this democracy had two principal characteristics, but 
these characteristics were actually the reverse of those of republicanism.  First, in 
stark contrast to republicanism, the emerging democracy sought to incorporate 
private interests into the affairs of government.  Indeed, by creating private 
corporations of banks, canals, and other businesses, it reverted to the older 
monarchical notion of using private power to carry out public ends.  Secondly and at 
the same time, however, this democracy broke the traditional identity between social 
and political authority.  In a democracy political leaders did not have to be 
independently wealthy or liberally educated disinterested gentlemen.  They could be 
ordinary people with interests to promote. 
The spread of these characteristics alarmed many of the Revolutionary gentry in 
the 1780s, and created their fears of what they called an excess of democracy.  In the 
eyes of many liberally educated gentry these popular middling upstarts like William 
Findley, who were spokesmen for democracy, not only were ignorant of coherent 
law-making processes, but they seemed incapable of the kind of disinterestedness 
that republican political leaders were supposed to display. 
By the 1780s, Madison and other gentry had come to realize that this kind of 
democratic interest-based politics was not going to go away.  They knew too that the 
regulation of these private factional interests was becoming the principal task of 
modern legislation, which meant that the spirit of party and faction was likely in the 
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future to be involved in the ordinary operations of government.  Yet they also knew, 
as Madison put it, that no government could be just if parties, that is, people with 
private interests to promote, became judges in their own causes. 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause [wrote Madison in 
Federalist No. 10], because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, 
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.  With equal, nay with greater 
reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same 
time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation but so 
many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single 
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?  And what 
are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the 
causes which they determine?  Is a law proposed concerning private 
debts?  It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and 
the debtors on the other.  Justice ought to hold the balance between them.  
Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most 
numerous party, or in other words, the most powerful faction must be 
expected to prevail.19 
Since the popular colonial assembles had often begun as courts (the ”General 
Court of Massachusetts”) and much of their legislation had resembled adjudication, 
Madison’s use of judicial imagery to describe the factional and interest-group 
politics in the state legislatures was not entirely misplaced.  But this judicial imagery 
did prevent Madison from thinking freshly in solving the problem of modern 
democratic legislative politics that he had so brilliantly diagnosed.  He still hoped in 
a traditional fashion that the government might become, as he put it, a “disinterested 
& dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions & interests in the 
State.”20 
He and the other founders in 1787, in other words, continued to believe that there 
were some disinterested gentlemen left in America to act as neutral judges or 
umpires and that the best government was one that allowed such men to dominate.  
Experience in the 1780s had shown that enlightened statesmen would not often be in 
charge in the small spheres of the states.  Instead, Madison hoped that the extended 
republic created by the proposed federal Constitution might make for more 
enlightened leadership.  The extension of the political domain over the whole nation 
would increase the number of interests and factions in the society to the point where 
it was less likely that a majority could combine in government to oppress the rights 
of minorities and individuals.  Madison understood that this process had worked in 
religion.  The multiplicity of religious sects in America prevented any one of them 
from dominating and permitted the enlightened reason of liberal gentlemen like 
Jefferson and himself to shape public policy and church-state relations and to protect 
the rights of minorities.  “In a free government,” wrote Madison in Federalist No. 
51, “the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights.  It 
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consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the 
multiplicity of sects.”21 
At the same time the extended federal republic’s enlarged electoral districts 
would tend to screen out the kinds of interested men who had dominated the state 
legislatures in the 1780s and result in elections more likely being carried by men, in 
Madison’s words, “whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them 
superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice,” in other words, the kinds of 
men who could best act as impartial umpires among the clashing interests.22 
Finding gentlemen in America who were capable of transcending the 
marketplace and making disinterested judgments was not easy.  Many thought that 
only in the South was the ideal image of the disinterested independent gentleman 
even partially realized, and there, of course, gentleman farmers like Jefferson had 
hundreds of slaves to keep them in leisure and wine.  Alexander Hamilton tried to 
argue that members of the learned professions, by which he mainly meant lawyers, 
could best play the role of impartial umpires among the conflicting interests of the 
society.  It may have been true, he wrote in Federalist No. 35, that mechanics, 
merchants, and farmers were deeply involved in the marketplace, and because they 
had interests to promote, they could never be trusted in politics to make disinterested 
judgments.  This was not the case, however, said Hamilton, with members of the 
learned professions.  They made the best kind of political leaders.  They “will feel a 
neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of industry,” said 
Hamilton, and therefore will be most likely to be “an impartial arbiter” among the 
diverse interests and occupations of the society.23  Thus Hamilton reinforced a notion 
that has carried into our own time—that lawyers and other professionals are 
somehow free of the marketplace, are less selfish and interested and therefore better 
equipped for disinterested political leadership than merchants and businessmen. 
So the new Constitution was designed to control or mitigate the democratic 
politics that had emerged as a consequence of the Revolution.  We know what 
happened. Private interests were not kept out of even the elevated nature of the new 
federal government.  Lots of scrambling middling sorts like William Findley made it 
into the Congress. 
Because the supporters of the Constitution, the Federalists, seemed to be 
perpetuating the classical republican tradition of virtuous patrician leadership in 
government, the opponents of the Constitution, or the Anti-Federalists, felt 
compelled to challenge that tradition.  There was, the Anti-Federalists said 
repeatedly, no disinterested gentlemanly elite that could feel "sympathetically the 
wants of the people" and speak for their "feelings, circumstances, and interests."24  
That elite had its own particular interests to promote.  However liberally educated 
and elevated such independent gentry might be, they were no more free of the lures 
and interests of the marketplace than anyone else. 
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The consequences of such Anti-Federalist thinking were immense and indeed 
devastating for republican government.  If enlightened and liberal gentlemen, that is, 
those who had gone to Harvard and Princeton, were involved in the marketplace and 
had interests to promote just like everyone else, they were really no different from all 
those common people—artisans, shopkeepers, traders, and others—who had 
traditionally been denied a role in political leadership because of their overriding 
absorption in their private occupational interests.  In short, the Anti-Federalists were 
saying that liberally educated gentlemen  were no more capable than ordinary people 
of classical republican disinterestedness and that consequently there was no one in 
the society equipped to promote an exclusive public interest that was distinguishable 
from the private interests of people. 
One of the crucial moments in the history of American politics—maybe the 
crucial moment—occurred in 1786 during several days of debate in the Pennsylvania 
assembly over the re-chartering of the Bank of North America.  The debate—the 
only important one we have recorded of state legislative proceedings in the 1780s—
centered on the role of interest in public affairs. 
The principals in this debate were William Findley, the Scotch-Irish ex-weaver 
from western Pennsylvania and a defender of the debtor-paper money interests in the 
state, and Robert Morris, the wealthiest merchant in the state with aristocratic 
aspirations and a major supporter of the re-chartering of the bank.  Findley had been 
a schoolmaster and farmer and a militia captain before ending up as a political 
officeholder.  He was the very prototype of a later professional politician and was as 
much a product of the Revolution as the more illustrious patriots like John Adams or 
James Madison.  He had no lineage to speak of, he did not go to college, and he 
possessed no great wealth.  He was completely self-taught and self-made, but not in 
the manner of a Benjamin Franklin who acquired the cosmopolitan attributes of a 
gentlemen.  Findley’s origins showed, and conspicuously so.  In his middling 
aspirations, middling achievements, and middling resentments he accurately 
represented the kind of democracy that was emerging in America, especially in the 
northern half of America. 
Indeed, Findley was precisely the sort of backcountry legislator whom gentry like 
Madison in the 1780s were accusing of being narrow, illiberal, and interested in their 
promotion of paper money and debtor-relief legislation.  Now, with the issue of the 
re-chartering of the bank, Findley had an opportunity to get back at his aristocratic 
accusers and he made the most of it.  Morris and his genteel Philadelphia ilk had 
continually tried to pose as disinterested gentlemen in the classical mold, who were 
above crass marketplace interests and concerned only with the public good.  But 
Findley and his western colleagues refused to let Morris and the aristocratic 
supporters of the bank get away with this pose.  These supporters of the bank's re-
chartering, Findley charged, were themselves interested men; they were directors or 
stockholders of the bank and thus had no right to claim that they were neutral 
disinterested umpires only deciding what was good for the state.  The advocates of 
the bank "feel interested in it personally, and therefore by promoting it they were 
acting as judges in their own cause.”  This of course is the very phrase that Madison 
used in the Federalist when he attacked politicians like Findley. 
There was nothing new in these charges.  To accuse one's opponent of being self-
interested was conventional rhetorical strategy in eighteenth-century debates.  But 
Findley went on to pursue another line of argument that was new—startlingly new.  
He accepted Morris's and the other bank supporters' interestedness in the bank.  
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There was nothing unusual or improper in their supporting re-chartering of the bank, 
he said.  They were, after all, directors and stockholders in the bank, and their 
promotion of the bank was only to be expected.  "Any others in their situation . . .," 
said Findley, "would do as they did."  Morris and the other investors in the bank had 
every "right to advocate their own cause, on the floor of this house."  But, said 
Findley, they had no right to protest when others realize "that it is their own cause 
they are advocating; and to give credit to their opinions, and to think of their votes 
accordingly."  They had no right, in other words, to try to pass off their support of 
their personal cause as an act of disinterested virtue.  The promotion of interests in 
politics, suggested Findley, was quite legitimate, as long as it was open and above 
board and not disguised by specious claims of genteel disinterestedness.  The 
promotion of private interests was in fact what American politics ought to be about. 
Findley was not content merely to expose and justify the reality of interest-group 
politics in representative legislatures.  He glimpsed some of the important 
implications of such interest-group politics, and in just a few remarks he challenged 
the entire classical tradition of disinterested public leadership and set forth a 
rationale for competitive democratic politics that has never been bettered.  If 
representatives were elected to promote the particular interests and private causes of 
their constituents, then the idea that such representatives were simply disinterested 
gentlemen, squire worthies called by duty to shoulder the burdens of public service, 
became archaic.  It may have been meaningful in the past when such virtuous men 
did exist, for such a disinterested representative to make no effort on his own behalf 
and simply stand for election.  But now, said Findley, in the democratic America of 
many interests where the candidate for the legislature "has a cause of his own to 
advocate, interest will dictate the propriety of canvassing for a seat."  Such interest-
group politics meant that politically ambitious men, even those with interests and 
causes to advocate, now could legitimately run and compete for electoral office. It 
was OK now for parties to be judges in their own causes.25 
Despite all the sarcasm and mingled emotion with which Findley in 1786 put 
forward this radical suggestion, he was anticipating in this one statement all of the 
modern democratic political developments of the succeeding generation, what we 
came to know as democracy:  the increased electioneering and competitive politics, 
the open promotion of interests in legislation, including the chartering of banks and 
other private corporations, the emergence of political parties, the extension of the 
actual and direct representation in government of particular groups, including ethnic 
and religious groups, and the eventual weakening, if not the repudiation, of the 
classical republican ideal that legislators were supposed to be disinterested umpires 
standing above the play of interests. 
Findley and the other spokesmen for popular interests who emerged in these 
years made no pretense to having any special personal or social qualifications to rule.  
They were not wealthy men, they had not gone to Harvard or Princeton, and they 
were often proud of their parochial and localist outlook.  Their claim to office was 
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based solely on their ability to garner votes and satisfy the private interests of their 
constituents. 
The awesome power of this democratic polity, with people becoming judges in 
their own causes, was such that our political leaders over the past two centuries have 
struggled to constrain and mitigate its effects.  In fact, that is what our current 
concern with campaign financing is all about.  From the very beginning of our 
national history we Americans have used a variety of devices and institutions to 
immunize ourselves from the harmful consequences of too much democracy, too 
much factious promotion of private interests in the name of the people.  No doubt the 
most important of these devices has been the judiciary, the institution most removed 
from the people and most resistant to the pressure of private interests.  Indeed, by 
playing the role that Madison had wanted the legislatures to play—impartially 
adjudicating among contending parties and interests—the judiciary suddenly 
emerged out of its colonial insignificance to become the principal means of 
protecting minority rights and individual liberties against interest-mongering popular 
legislatures.  By the early nineteenth century some Americans were arguing that 
popularly elected legislatures could no longer solve many of the problems of their 
lives.  “For the varying exigencies of social life, for the complicated interests of an 
enterprising nation, the positive acts of the legislature,” said Alexander Dallas in 
1805, “can provide little.”26  Only judges interpreting the common law could sort out 
the competing interests.  Many, including Madison in his later years, eventually 
concluded that the judiciary was the only governmental institution in America that 
came close to resembling the disinterested and impartial umpires that the 
revolutionaries had earlier yearned for.27 
Today we have come to accept democracy, that is, popular legislative politics 
where the people are judges in their own causes, only because we have a presumably 
disinterested judiciary, among other institutions like the Federal Reserve Board, that 
limits and constrains that democracy.  In time we Americans have come to 
emphasize the judicial constraints on popular government and the judicial protection 
of individual rights and liberties to the point where such constraints and such 
protections often seem more important to the meaning of our democracy than does 
the expression of popular majorities.  Limiting popular government and protecting 
individual and minority rights without at the same time denying the sovereign public 
power of the people was the great dilemma of political leaders at the founding of the 
nation.  And, indeed, it remains today still the great dilemma of all liberal 
democracies. 
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